CPEC to re-energize Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade

The first-ever Islamabad Security Dialogue (ISD) was held in Islamabad on March 17-18, 2021, under the National Security Division of the Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with various think tanks. Sessions were devoted to comprehensive national security, economic security, human security, regional peace and security, and the evolving world order and Pakistan. Luminaries included a former American ambassador, federal ministers, politicians from across the political divide and academics like Dr Akbar S Ahmed. Prime Minister Imran Khan addressed the inaugural session, whereas Gen Bajwa spoke at the opening session.

Before discussing the conclusive argument of the Dialogue, it is instructive to search for a security framework for the Indo-Pakistan region as perceived by the United States. A 2021 RAND study, “Implementing Restraint: Changes in US Regional Security Policies to Operationalize a Realist Grand Strategy of Restraint”, lays down the academic building blocks of the US security architecture.

In Chapter 5, dealing with South Asia, the study — in the backdrop of the Afghan war, terrorism and state collapse — discusses US relations with both Pakistan and India including US posture and security cooperation/assistance. Current US strategy documents indicate no vital US security interests at stake in South Asia, calling for minimal changes to the existing “US goals” in South Asia, compared to Europe and Asia-Pacific. These goals constitute small-scale counterterrorism missions, improving nuclear security (in Pakistan) and averting nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. The US sees India as a “natural counterweight to Chinese ambitions”, hence the push for stronger Indo-US ties… but with complications.

Study sources argue for ending the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, supporting a small residual counterterrorism mission (for security assistance and intelligence cooperation), noting Afghanistan will not become a terrorist sanctuary even under the Taliban rule. Identifying the Taliban as an important stakeholder for the future of Afghanistan, it considers the peace agreement as a “reasonable pathway for America to extricate itself from Afghanistan” despite being “imperfect”.

The study contends that extra-regional groups including ISIS and Al Qaeda, currently enjoy only limited freedom of action/sanctuary in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan, with restrained operational ability. Therefore, given the potential backlash against the US, targeted killings/drone strikes in Pakistan be scaled back and resorted to selectively.

On state collapse in Pakistan, the odds are favourable due to Pakistan’s population (215 million… as reported), a “capable military” and nuclear weapons. The study points to the absurdity (with panelists divided) of the notion of seizure of Pakistani nukes by the US/allies in the event of state failure, considering the non-feasibility of large-scale ground or air-ground combined operations.

Authors of the study do not support “formal alliances” in South Asia as against promoting US interests through cooperation with both countries. They remain less hopeful about the relationship with Pakistan that is traditionally borne out of “necessity rather than choice”. The future slide is attributed in part to the potential US withdrawal from Afghanistan; non-alignment of US and Pakistan’s political and military goals (due to Islamabad’s alleged support for proxy forces); and weakening of the US influence over policy formulation in Pakistan. The study, hence calls for lower levels of engagement. However, Chinese influence in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)/ China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) raises US interest and stakes. There is the archaic argument of further assistance to the Pakistan Army and other forces, indexed to suppressing militancy.

Supporting a robust relationship with India, in an attempt to box in China, there is emphasis on cooperation without security guarantees. The study also notes frequent Indian attempts to resist a deeper security cooperation with the US, given the Indian political establishment’s Cold War fascination with non-alignment. There is inference that India might balance against China even without a closer partnership with America. For US policymakers, issues like balancing US relations with India and Pakistan and Kashmir remain contentious.

Preventing a nuclear exchange as a cherished goal, stands out as radiation from a potential nuclear exchange between India-Pakistan would have global effects. The US has sought to improve Indo-US interoperability, exchange of technology and secure information especially satellite imagery (focused on the disputed Line of Actual Control, LAC, with China), and space operations, as part of the ongoing defense partnership.

The study talks about a US posture dominating the maritime commons around South Asia, enabling future redeployment of US troops to the region. The US, however, needs to maintain overflight rights, basing and port access for quick deployment, the study recommends.

By and large, the US policy prescriptions towards South Asia are “less developed than for other regions, reflecting the lower priority”. The US seems to be in a quandary over its ties with India too. Too deep a security involvement would affect US relations with China, which is a core relationship; hence a sensible calibration by Team Biden. Such cooperation also could cause insecurity in Pakistan, making the region “less stable and less amenable to US interests”. The US ambivalence over Kashmir by not toeing the Indian line and the occasional tilt towards Pakistan reflects this hedging ambiguity. At a deeper level, the US relationship even with India is transactional in nature, indicating lower significance for the region as a whole.

The above iterations amply demonstrate that India, China and Pakistan need to work among themselves for regional peace. The trichotomy of this relationship will resolve together. Despite US inducements, India has not taken the US bait during the 2019 stand-off over Ladakh.

Refreshingly, the ISD, departing from Pakistan’s traditional notions of ‘national security’, alluded to a more inclusive security construct comprising “economic progress, technological advancement, regional connectivity, knowledge entrenchment, and political stability.” Gen Bajwa summed it up reiterating that the contemporary national security concept now entails “providing a conducive environment in which aspirations of human security, national progress and development could be realised.” The multi-layered national security paradigm has external factors (global and regional environment) as outer layers; and the internal factors (internal peace, stability and developmental orientation) as inner layers.

The stated security paradigm contains a geo-economic vision as its foundation, with three pillars, namely: lasting and enduring peace within and outside, non-interference of any kind (in the internal affairs of neighbouring and regional countries), and boosting intra-regional trade and connectivity. The last pillar in particular is the most critical, articulated though CPEC’s North-South routes. Pakistan seeks to extend CPEC to Central/Western Asia as an energy and trade corridor. It will in the process, re-energise the Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade.

The ISD changed the foreign policy alignment for better, one hopes.